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       The economic integration sought by Arab countries has been a merely aspirational 
one. Arab countries have not risen to the challenges posed to it by their unique 
circumstances. Instead, Arab countries have failed to develop the strength that would be 
conferred by economic integration. 
       My inquiry will assess why, many decades after first attempts of economic 
integration, Arab countries have not been more successful in emulating the success of the 
European Union, a paradigm of successful economic integration. Specifically, I will 
explore obstacles to Arab economic integration and address the political and economic 
factors that play a role to achieve this goal. The central hypothesis of this paper is that 
there must be fundamental structural changes in Arab economic integration agreements. 
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Effective dispute resolution mechanism and few opt-out provisions speak to a greater will 
to commit to integration. Arab countries must confront internal dissension and lack of 
implementation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
       The current era is characterized by the proliferation of regional trade agreements 
around the world.1 In the wake of the suspension of the Doha Round in late July 2006, an 
avalanche of bilateral and regional free trade agreements will fill in the vacuum. The 
legacy of the failure of multilateralism is a renewed global push toward bilateralism.  
       Arab countries initiated one of the first attempts at an economic and political 
integration.2 However, these attempts have not been successful. On the other hand, many 
other regions in North America and Europe have enjoyed far more success despite their 
later integration attempts.3 
      Several steps toward a free trade area were taken under the auspices of the Arab 
League, which was established in 1945. The Charter of the League provides that one of 
                                               
* Bashar H. Malkawi is Assistant Professor of International Trade Law at the Hashemite University, 
Jordan. He holds an S.J.D in International Trade law from the American University, Washington College of 
Law, and an L.L.M in International Trade law from the University of Arizona. I am grateful to the 
anonymous reviewers for their critical comments and suggestions.  
1 Looking at regional integration, one can immediately see the upward pattern of the trend. Between 1978 
and 1991, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) remained nearly static. Since the beginning of 
the 1990s, the trend was reversed and one could observe a constant dramatic increase in the number of 
RTAs that are being formed. From 42 RTAs notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) according to Article 7(a) of the GATT in 1991, the number increased by 107% to 87 Agreements 
in 1998. See Matthew W. Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9 Currents: 
International Trade Law Journal 25, 27 (2000). According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), there 
are currently 170 RTAs in force. The WTO expects the total number of RTAs to rise to nearly 300 by the 
end of 2006. 
2 Arab Countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Autonomous Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
3 See Mario Patrono, The Unity of Europe: A Dream, or a Reality in the Making? 35 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 329 (2004). See also Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 38 Texas International Law Journal 489, 495 (2003) (NAFTA 
was ratified by the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1993, in order to promote trade and investment 
between these three countries). 
 3 
the League’s purposes is to promote economic and financial cooperation between Arab 
countries including commercial relations.4 Promoting trade served as the primary means 
for economic integration. Several treaties were signed to accomplish this purpose: (1) the 
Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty among Member States of the League of 
Arab States in 1950, (2) the Convention for Facilitating Trade and Regulating Trade 
Transit in 1953, and (3) the Arab Economic Unity Agreement in 1957. In addition, some 
attempts for Arab Common Market took place in 1964. 
       In the 1980s, Arab countries entered into many sub-regional agreements. These 
agreements included the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union.5 
In 1981, some members of the League entered into the Agreement to Facilitate and 
Develop Inter-Arab Trade Area (AFDATA), which focuses its concern on trade in 
goods.6 AFDATA does not include provisions for trade in services or investment.  
       No progress was made in implementing the AFDATA until 1998, when it was 
revived again and an Executive Program, known as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA), for implementation was created.7 Welfare gains may occur for producers and 
consumers if GAFTA were completed. For example, tariff reductions would expand 
intra-trade and increase intra-industry trade and cooperation by permitting Arab 
                                               
4 See Charter of the League of Arab States, art. II(1) (1945).  
5 The GCC emerged as the only viable subregional free trade area in the Arab region. The GCC consists of 
six member states: (1) The United Arab Emirates; (2) Bahrain; (3) Saudi Arabia; (4) Oman; (5) Kuwait; 
and (6) Qatar. See Amr Daoud Marar, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 10 Law & 
Business Review of the Americas 475, 491 (2004). Member states of the Arab Maghreb Union are: (1) 
Algeria; (2) Libya; (3) Morocco; (4) Mauritania; and (5) Tunisia. See Information on the Arab Maghreb 
Union, available at http://www.maghrebarabe.org/ar/index.htm (last visited February 22, 2007).   
6 These members are: Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Somalia, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, and Kuwait. See Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Inter-Arab 
Trade Area, available at http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id= 349&level 
_id=110&page_no=4 (last visited December 4, 2006). 
7 Members of the Executive Program are: the GCC members, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. See the Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area, available at http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id= 349&level 
_id=110&page_no=4 (last visited December 4, 2006).   
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producers to ship semi-finished products to another Arab country for further processing.8 
Moreover, with full elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers, Arab importers would 
experience some efficiency gains from the shift to trade with other Arab countries that are 
lower-cost producers.9   
       The paper is divided into two major sections. This paper first discusses provisions of 
the AFDATA and the Executive Program. The paper, then, focuses on the progress and 
the problems surrounding its implementation. 
II. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF AFDATA 
       The AFDATA aims to liberalize trade between Arab countries.10 The liberalization 
of trade was to occur through two methods. The first method is recognized as the full 
liberalization method in which the AFDATA exempts certain categories of goods from 
all tariffs, similar taxes, and all other trade barriers.11 The second method encompasses 
the progressive liberalization method in which Arab countries negotiate concessions to 
reduce tariffs on goods with the purpose of reaching a zero tariff on all goods and 
eliminating all other barriers to trade.12 The AFDATA provides that parties facilitate the 
finance, credit, and payment for trade among them.13 The Arab Monetary Fund serves to 
establish a system for settlement of payments that result from trade between the parties. 
       The Economic and Social Council of the Arab League (ESCL), which consists of 
ministers of foreign and economic affairs of Arab countries, is assigned to supervise the 
                                               
8 The study cited the garment industry as an example of intra-industry cooperation. See Samiha Fawzy, 
Globalization and Firm Competitiveness in the Middle East and North Africa Region 189-191 (2002).  
9 See Ahmed Abdalla, Inter-Arab Trade and the Potential Success of Arab Free Trade Area 11 (1998).  
10 See Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Inter-Arab Trade Area, art. II (1)(a)-(c) (Feb. 27, 1981). 
11 Id. art. VI. 
12 Id. art. VII(1)-(2). 
13 Id. art. X(1),(3),(4). 
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implementation of the AFDATA.14 The ESCL, acting by a two-thirds majority of 
member states present at the meeting, possesses several functions in relation to the 
AFDATA.15 For example, the ESCL could draft and issue collective lists of goods that 
are exempted from tariffs.16 Moreover, the ESCL could determine which Arab countries 
are less developed for purposes of the AFDATA.17 However, the functions of the ESCL 
do not include the power to legislate. 
       The ESCL empowered to examine complaints of parties regarding trade 
discrimination inflicted upon them by others as a result of exporting their products.18 The 
ESCL may assign the dispute to an ad hoc committee and delegate a portion of its powers 
to the committee. In every case, the ESCL could decide the method of adjudicating the 
dispute.19 AFDATA lacks details on the binding character of the ESCL rulings in the 
complaints examined and what happens in case of non-compliance. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the dispute settlement under AFDATA since data 
is absent that would have indicated how many complaints were processed or withdrawn. 
The absence of data hints that the dispute system of AFDATA is non-or under-utilized. 
Therefore, the development of AFDATA jurisprudence is lacking and there are no 
precedents to which the parties in the future will observe. 
       An important setback of AFDATA has been that it was more or less a declaration on 
the part of the signatories. AFDATA was not comprehensive in coverage. Arab countries 
could pick and choose manufactured products for tariff exemptions. Tariff reduction was 
                                               
14 Id. art. XI(1). 
15 Every member state has one vote. Meetings of the ESCL, including the meetings where voting occurs, 
are non-public. See Internal Regulation of the Economics and Social Council of the Arab League, 
Resolution No. 675-23, art. V(2), IV (September 22, 1977). 
16 See Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Inter-Arab Trade Area, supra note 10, art. XI(1)(a)-(b). 
17 Id. art. XI (1)(e). 
18 Id. art. XI (1)(f).  
19 Id. art. XIII. 
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determined through negotiations following a product-by-product approach, which is 
extraordinarily cumbersome.20 AFDATA did not lay out a time schedule for the 
elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers.   
III. PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTING THE AFDATA AND ESTABLISHING 
THE GREATER ARAB FREE TRADE AREA 
       In 1997, the ESCL decided to implement an Executive Program (the Program) to 
effectuate the provisions of the AFDATA with the goal of establishing GAFTA by 
2008.21 As such, the Program acts as a framework for GAFTA which would be created 
under the same institutional set up as the AFDATA.22 Any Arab country must satisfy two 
conditions to join the Program. First, the Arab country in question must ratify the 
AFDATA. Second, the Arab country must agree to the Program by depositing local 
regulations issued instructing its customs authority to apply the Program. 
A. TRADE IN GOODS 
       The Program provides for the progressive and linear tariff reductions on goods over 
a period of ten years at an equal annual 10 percent.23 The basis for calculating the 
reduction of tariffs on imported goods shall be those rates in effect on January 1, 1998.24 
                                               
20 The product-by-product approach raises a technical problem of how to deal with thousands of specific 
products. Therefore, product-by-product approach makes progress in trade negotiations almost impossible. 
See John H. Jackson et. al., Legal Problems of International Economics Relations 380 (West Publishing 
Company, St. Paul, Minnesota 1995).  
21 See Economic and Social Council of the League, Resolution No. 1317-59, art. I(1) (February 19, 1997).  
22 The Program obliges Arab countries to follow the rules and institutions included in the AFDATA. Id. art. 
I(2), VI. 
23 The ESCL later opted for a shorter period ending in 2005. Accordingly, the annual reduction of the tariffs 
and similar taxes will be 20 percent in 2004 and 2005. See Economic and Social Council of the League, 
Res. No. 1431, Ordinary Meeting No. 69, art. I(1), (February 2002). 
24 See Economic and Social Council of the League, Resolution No. 1317-59, supra note 21, art. I(7). 
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Nonetheless, members of GAFTA may agree to accelerate the elimination of all tariffs 
for any imported goods.25  
       The tariff reduction formula adopted in GAFTA improves market access whereby 
tariff reduction applies across-the-board to all tariff lines. The linear approach offers the 
advantage of being transparent and ensures that high tariffs are reduced faster than lower 
tariffs.26 Furthermore, progressive tariff reductions help countries which have tariff 
revenue dependency to find alternative sources of revenue. However, the tariff reduction 
scheme of GAFTA did not address tariff peaks and tariff escalation.   
       Additional taxes and tariff-like charges (known as para-tariffs) are treated like tariffs 
and thus according to the Program will be eliminated over a period of ten years. 
Examples of para-tariffs include stamp taxes and consular fees where they increase as the 
value of imports increase or do not reflect the actual service rendered. Arab countries use 
different forms of para-tariffs that have the equivalent effect of tariffs. Jordan, for 
example, imposes fees for customs overtime wage and traffic administration fee.27 
       Arab countries are allowed to exempt from GAFTA tariff cut program certain 
products for religious or health reasons. For example, Arab countries maintain prohibitive 
tariffs on alcohol, pork, and tobacco. Tariffs on alcohol, pork, and tobacco can be as high 
as 200 percent.   
                                               
25 Id. art. I(9). 
26 See G. Gregory Letterman, Basics of the International System of Customs and Tariffs 249 (Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. New York 2001).  
27 Tunisia imposes a computer data word-processing fee on each page of the customs declaration. Egypt 
imposes statistical tax of 1 percent on all imports. See M. M Kostecki & M. J. Tymowski, Customs Duties 
Versus Other Import Charges in the Developing Countries, 19 Journal of World Trade Law 3, 269-281 
(1985) (Some Arab countries such as Libya, Algeria, Egypt, and Mauritania impose taxes on foreign trade 
transactions in the form of compulsory foreign exchange levies and advanced import deposits. Such taxes 
are not reported in the financial statistics on import taxes). 
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       The tariff scheme of GAFTA offers Arab countries ambitious cuts in tariffs while 
allowing them to protect certain sensitive sectors. For example, for a number of industrial 
products, the greater part of market opening will take place toward the end of the ten year 
phase-out period for tariff reduction. This is intended to enable the local industry to 
restructure so as to be able to face off competition when full liberalization occurs by 
2008. For other industrial products, yet to be determined, the Program provides the 
possibility of exempting them from the tariff reductions all together subject to certain 
rules and conditions to be set by of the ESCL. The decision to allow exemptions without 
determining the type of industrial products and the guidelines to follow might lead 
member countries to take advantage of this loophole, thus reducing the chance of 
GAFTA realizing its full potential for trade expansion.  
       Arab countries such as Lebanon and Tunisia expressed concerns regarding the 
liberalization of agricultural trade. Therefore, the Program invented the concept of 
"Agricultural Calendar". Any member may decide not to reduce tariffs on agricultural 
products during peak harvest seasons by listing these products on the Agricultural 
Calendar.28 For the application of the Agricultural Calendar, GAFTA provides for certain 
criteria. First, the maximum time allowed for a listed product to remain on the calendar 
cannot exceed seven months, with a maximum of forty-five months in total for all listed 
products.29 Second, each GAFTA member is allowed to exclude ten products as 
maximum.30  
                                               
28 A list of these agriculture products and seasons must be communicated to the ESCL.   
29 See Economic and Social Council of the League, Resolution No. 1317-59, supra note 21, art. II(2)-(3).   
30 Ten Arab countries forwarded a list of agricultural products covering some thirty fresh vegetables and 
fruit products. See Bernard Hoekman & Jamal Zarrouk, Catching Up with the Competition: Trade 
Opportunities and Challenges for Arab Countries 290 (University of Michigan Press; Ann Arbor 2000).  
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       It is to be noted that the Agricultural Calendar does not mean prohibitions. Products 
included in the Calendar are allowed to enter, however they do not benefit from the 
gradual reductions in tariff rates during specific time periods. In all other periods, the 
same listed products would be subjected to the lower tariff rates. Although the 
Agricultural Calendar was intended to help the transition to freer trade for certain Arab 
countries, those countries applied the Agricultural Calendar permanently thus effectively 
shutting their domestic markets in the face of imported agricultural products.     
       The Program prohibits non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on Arab goods traded within the 
framework of the Program.31 NTBs may include product standards, certification and 
testing, and customs procedures. Using NTBs is a more serious problem for integration 
than any tariff measure taken to control imports. NTBs are less obvious, complex, and 
not easy to gauge.32 GAFTA established a committee to sort out all NTBs for elimination. 
However, to date, GAFTA members have not entered into negotiations to remove NTBs 
that restrain intra-regional trade. Moreover, GAFTA lacks precise mechanism or criteria 
to determine which standards or customs procedures constitute barriers to trade. Thus, 
like other regional agreements, the GAFTA committee could use a reference to the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the WTO Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).33    
                                               
31 See Economic and Social Council of the League, Resolution No. 1317-59, supra note 21, art. III. 
32 For explanation on the reasons for the use of non-tariffs barriers see Edward John Ray, The Political 
Economy of International Trade Law and Policy: Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs 
and the Rise in Non-Tariffs Barriers 8 Northwestern Journal of  International law & Business 285, 294-298, 
303-305 (1987). 
33 NAFTA, for example, was negotiated more or less concurrently with the negotiations that led to the 
WTO, and the proposals in each tended to filter through the other. Therefore, the provisions of the NAFTA 
relating to NTBs bear striking resemblance to those of the WTO TBT and SPS Agreements. Both the 
NAFTA chapters on technical barriers and on sanitary and phytosanitary measures incorporate by familiar 
WTO principles concerning measures to protect human, plant, or animal health from hazards relating to 
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B. RULES OF ORIGIN 
       The Program contains provisions relating to rules of origin.34 These rules are 
designed to guarantee that tariff concessions are enjoyed only by products of the 
countries that are parties to GAFTA. The Program confers origin if the exported product 
meets a mathematical requirement, known as the value-added or percentage rule. A 
product originates from a member state if the value added in the member state is at least 
40 percent of the final value of the finished product. To meet the 40 percent, the value-
added rule requires adding the sum of the cost or value of materials produced in the 
member state plus labor and overhead costs. 
        The value-added test is designed to ensure that the process of transformation has 
resulted in the inclusion of a significant degree of exporting country content. Although 
the 40 percent value-added rule is not considered too restrictive for a regional trade 
agreement, low-wage countries can have problems in meeting the requirements of this 
rule. For example, if a Kuwaiti worker applies eight hours labor to an imported input, the 
valued-added test could be met easily. A Somali worker, on the other hand, may fail to 
sufficiently raise the value of the product when employing the same amount of hours 
because of a lower wage level.  
       Member states of GAFTA are supposed to launch negotiation to reach an agreement 
on detailed rules of origin. However, an agreement on detailed rules of origin has yet to 
                                                                                                                                            
agricultural products and all other product market regulations. See Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory 
Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 University of Chicago Law Review 1, 35 (1999). 
34 See Economic and Social Council of the League, Resolution No. 1317-59, supra note 21, art. I(4).  
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be reached between Arab countries.35 Lack of agreement on rules of origin has delayed 
full implementation of the Program. 
       Any future rules of origin agreement should include a cumulation rule in the 
Program, which states that the costs or values of materials produced or originated in one 
member state may be add up to certain percentage of the 40 percent. The cumulation rule 
may lessen the impact of 40 percent value added test. In addition, like North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), any future Arab regional agreement could adopt a 
“change in tariff heading” rule, i.e. non-originating materials must change or shift from 
one tariff heading/subheading into another as a result of production that occurs in a 
member state.36 Furthermore, the Program should incorporate a de minimis rule whereby 
rules of origin do not apply to non-originating materials if they account for no more than 
7 percent of the transaction value of the goods. The Program should avoid using specific 
rules or origin for certain products such as textiles and apparels.37  
                                               
35 See Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 2003, ch.12, at 2, available at 
<http://www.amf.org.ae/vEnglish/default.asp> (last visited September 21, 2006). 
 36 The concept of change in tariff heading was used first in the US-Canada FTA and then NAFTA. Chapter 
Four (rules of origin) in NAFTA has a general rule which determines that a good is considered to originate 
in North America if 1) the good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the territory of one or more of 
the parties to NAFTA 2) the non-originating materials used in the production of the good undergoes an 
applicable “change in tariff classification” as a result of production occurring entirely in the territory of one 
or more of the parties to NAFTA. For more on the change in tariff classification rule, the calculation of 
transaction-value and net cost methods for purposes of determining the change in tariff classification, and 
the difference between the two methods see Marie Kately St. Fort, A Comparison of the Rules of Origin in 
the United States under The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), and Under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 183 (1994). 
37 Some rules of origin for textiles and apparels are known as the “four operations” rule”. Under the “four 
operations” rule, a textile product will be considered a product of country A if the fabric is dyed and 
printed in country A and the dyeing and printing is accompanied by two or more of the following 
operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping, decating, permanent stiffening, weighting, permanent 
embossing or moireing. See Franklin Dehousse et al., The EU-USA Dispute Concerning the New American 
Rules of Origin for Textile Products, 36 Journal of World Trade 1, 69 (2002).     
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       The Program should provide an advance ruling for origin purposes, which may allow 
exporters or importers to know the origin of their products before trading.38 One method 
to reduce the costs of rules of origin is to liberalize these rules for certain products that 
are subject to very low or zero tariff rates. Whether these products are exported from 
Jordan or Syria is irrelevant because these products will enter other countries at a low 
tariff rate. Alternatively, member states may conduct a study of different industries and 
use the results as a basis to potentially allow deviations from rules of origin. At any rate, 
member states of the Program should adopt a more enlightened, transparent, and fairer 
approach. Rules of origin should ensure effectiveness, uniformity, consistency, and 
administrability.  
C. CONSULTATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
       One of the important elements for the success of a free trade area continues to be an 
effective mechanism to settle disputes between parties. In the NAFTA integration 
example, panels played an important role in strengthening the free trade area.39 The 
                                               
38 An advance ruling could start by a letter from the importer/exporter to district director of customs in 
certain state inquiring on the origin of certain products. The letter would contain brief or detailed 
description of the product and the manufacturing process that would be conducted on the product. It may 
provide also cost information, if necessary.   
39 Chapter 19 of NAFTA establishes binational panels to review final determinations of antidumping and 
countervailing duty measures imposed under NAFTA parties’ national antidumping and countervailing 
duty law. Practically, this means that binational panels will replace domestic courts examining these 
determinations. Binational panels are also permitted to review amendments to the antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws of the NAFTA parties. Chapter 19 establishes an ambitious project to harmonize 
U.S., Canada, and Mexico’s antidumping and countervailing duty laws. An extraordinary challenge 
procedure is available as the only means of effectively “appealing” a panel decision and may be employed 
only in limited circumstances. NAFTA panel rulings are binding on all parties. For more discussion of 
NAFTA’s dispute resolution processes under chapter 19 procedure see David S. Huntington, Settling 
Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 43 Harvard International Law Journal 407 
(1993).  
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binding rulings of NAFTA panels helped clarify valid regulations and policies of member 
states, and they set aside those that did not conform to the obligation to liberalize trade.40 
       The AFDATA and the Program lack a binding dispute settlement mechanism. 
AFDATA lacks details on the binding character of the ESCL rulings in the complaints 
examined and what happens in case of non-compliance. Under the Program, every 
member state has established a point of contact for inquiries regarding the application of 
the AFDATA and the Program.41 Until a dispute settlement system is established, these 
points of contact receive complaints from the private sector and member states, and 
attempt to resolve these complaints. Over the years, several industries submitted 
complaints regarding obstacles to trade between member states. Those complaints 
involved non-application of tariff reduction and non-recognition of certificates of 
origin.42 The relevant points of contact dealt with a portion of those complaints.  
       A draft agreement for a dispute settlement mechanism, containing the steps to settle a 
dispute, has been prepared for adoption, yet to occur, by Arab countries. First, the dispute 
shall be referred to the appropriate points of contact for resolution.43 Second, if the points 
of contact fail to reach a resolution, the dispute shall be resolved through conciliatory 
discussions. Finally, the dispute is referred to a trade panel, whose ultimate decision is 
final.44 Importantly, the draft also provides a mandatory time limit for each step. 
                                               
40 See NAFTA Panel Ruling, Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, Dec. 
2, 1996, CDA-95-2008-01, NAFTA Panel Ruling, U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broomcorn Brooms 
from Mexico, Jan. 30, 1998, USA-97-2008-01.  
41 See Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 2001, at 322-323, available at 
<http://www.amf.org.ae/vEnglish/default.asp> (last visited July 10, 2006).   
42 See Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 2003, supra note 35, at 4. 
43 Id. at 5. 
44 It is unfortunate setback that the draft does not require an interim report issued by the panel and 
submitted to the parties for comments before it issues a final report. It is important to issue an interim 
report because the panel would estoppel the parties from coming backing and accuse the panel of 
misstating their arguments, ignoring their point of view, or denying them the right to present their 
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       The dispute settlement mechanism in the Program should require Arab countries to 
exert every effort to settle any contentious matter through cooperative consultations, 
which are intended to be cooperative and negotiated in nature, rather than adversarial and 
litigious. However, a formal dispute settlement mechanism shall be instituted if other 
methods fail to resolve the matter at issue. The dispute settlement mechanism should 
decide who has standing to bring complaints. In addition to Arab governments, the 
dispute settlement mechanism should allow private actors with a stake in the dispute and 
where they believe it violates the trade-related principles to petition. In sum, the dispute 
settlement mechanism in Arab regional agreement should afford some private rights of 
action to enjoin member countries from enforcing laws and regulations that violate core 
trade commitments.  
       Model Rules of Procedures should be developed so as to determine the numbers of 
panelists, their qualifications, expertise, nationality, and remuneration. Model rules of 
procedures may include policies, practices, and procedures for receiving initial and 
rebuttal written submissions, and how oral hearings will be conducted before a panel. The 
dispute settlement under the Program should call for increased transparency in 
proceedings, in particular the opening up of panel hearings to the public. In regards to the 
presentation of confidential business information in the panel proceedings, portions of 
any dispute hearing dealing with such confidential information would not be open to the 
public.  
       The Program should have an elaborate system of sanctions and measures in order to 
enforce trade norms. The most salient feature of dispute settlement under the Program 
                                                                                                                                            
argument. Therefore, the panel by issuing an interim report would give the parties once and for all the last 
chance to present their comments. 
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should be the possibility of authorizing a trade sanction such as the suspension of tariff 
reductions against a scofflaw member for non-compliance. Trade sanctions or threat 
thereof are to taken to ensure that the Arab country in breach brings its practices into 
conformity. There can be other alternatives for trade sanctions. For example, instead of 
trade sanctions, any Arab country guilty of illegal trade practices could pay a fine equal 
to the value of the damages assessed. Other alternative can be membership sanctions that 
limit or deny privileges of membership for any Arab country that fails to comply with the 
provisions of the AFDATA or the Program. Among the membership benefits that can be 
withdrawn are the right to vote and the ability to obtain financial or technical assistance. 
The goal of these sanctions and measures is to fortify the Program rules and promote 
respect for them. 
D. SPECIAL AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
       The interests of least-developed countries should be taken into account considering 
the special needs and circumstances of these countries.45 Therefore, the Program provides 
preferential treatment to least-developed member states as identified by the United 
Nations as such.46 Least-developed member states can submit a request that includes the 
nature of the preferential treatment needed and duration.  
       Flexibilities were given in the Program to least-developed Arab countries to 
undertake less than agreed tariff cuts. For example, least-developed Arab countries have 
until 2010 to abolish fully all tariffs and other taxes on goods originating in other Arab 
                                               
45 International trade law does not exist outside of the realm of justice. There are inherent or natural 
inequalities between developed and least-developed countries such as the smallness of least-developed 
country economies and their unequal share in natural endowments. These inequalities require special and 
differential treatment in favor of least-developed countries. See Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality, and 
Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade 31, 144 (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2003). 
46 The Program states that least-developed member states are those identified by the United Nations as 
such. Least-developed member states are: Palestinian Authority, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen See 
Economic and Social Council of the League, Resolution No. 1317-59, supra note 21, art. VII.  
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countries.47 Arab countries who give preferential treatment shall determine the particular 
conditions of any preferential treatment granted. However, these Arab countries should 
make trade preferences granted to least-developed Arab countries binding, unconditional, 
and inclusive of all goods. 
E. Labor Market Integration 
       Labor movement between Arab countries has been the most active compared to 
capital and trade movements.48 This result is based primarily on the existence of more 
restrictions on trade between Arab countries than for labor mobility. It can also be due to 
the common language, similar culture, and social traditions between citizens of different 
Arab countries. 
       During increase in the oil revenues, labor mobility can be an effective tool in serving 
the goals of Arab economic integration. For example, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a 
rapid acceleration of Arab workers movement to Arab oil-exporting countries.49 
However, unstable oil revenues coupled with ongoing efforts of Arab oil-exporting 
countries to nationalize their labor force can have negative effects on Arab labor 
mobility.50 As a result, the future contribution of labor market to Arab economic 
integration is likely to decline.  
                                               
47 Sudan chose to start a 20 percent annual reduction beginning in 2005. See Joint Arab Economic Report 
2003, supra note 35, at 1.  
48 There is a debate over the speed or sequence of labor movement. For example, some regional integration 
models suggest that labor movement could come at a later stage of integration. In some other cases, labor 
movement could occur as at the same time trade and investment happen. See Noemi Gal-Or, Labor 
Mobility under NAFTA: Regulatory Policy Spearheading the Social Supplement to the International Trade 
Regime, 15 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 365, 373 (1998). See also Michael J. 
Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 American Law & Economics Review 271, 
272, 284 (2003). 
49 See D. Salehi-Esfahani, Labor and Human Capital in the Middle East 42 (2001).  
50 In the UAE, the "Emiratization" drive has led to increasing the number of nationals in the financial sector 
by 189% between 1997 and 2002. See H. Handoussa & Z. Tzannatos, Employment Creation and Social 
Protection in the Middle East and North Africa 257 (2002).   
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       The present discourse in Arab regional trade agreements is no different from global 
patterns of trade agreement which emphasizes trade and investments flows and less the 
politically sensitive issues of labor mobility.51 As stands today, GAFTA has no provision 
on labor mobility. Thus, GAFTA should be amended so as to deal with labor mobility 
which is considered an important engine of Arab economic cooperation. There must be a 
comprehensive approach to Arab regional integration which combines: trade, investment, 
and labor mobility. Successful trade can support income and employment growth in 
poorer Arab countries thus reducing the income gap with rich Arab countries. Therefore, 
the success of GAFTA can compensate for the reduction in labor mobility.  
F. The Relationship between GAFTA and the WTO 
 
       GAFTA does not exist in legal vacuum. Rather, GAFTA is part of the wider corpus 
of GATT/WTO law.52 However, it was not until recently that GAFTA was notified to the 
WTO. In November 2006, Saudi Arabia notified GAFTA to the WTO.53 GAFTA was 
notified as GATT article XXIV free trade agreement.54 Since GAFTA was lately notified, 
there are no reviews yet on the agreement, submissions or comments from other WTO 
members.  
                                               
51 Labor mobility today is both restricted and facilitated by several international agreements. The WTO's 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has no provision for facilitating the entry of service 
providers into member countries. Although the EU, under its own provisions, requires no visa or work 
permits for Europeans to access employment in EU countries, EU workers enjoy limited rights to bring 
their families. Under NAFTA, members must allow the temporary entry of NAFTA members' citizens, but 
this provision is limited to high-skilled workers. See Ryan Walters, Managing Global Mobility Free Trade 
in Services in the Age of Terror, 6 University of California Davis Business Law Journal 92, 103-106 
(2006).  
52 The WTO Appellate Body in the United States-Reformulated Gasoline case stated regarding article 3.2 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that “direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade is not to be read in “clinical isolation” from public international law.” See 
Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, April 29, 
1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17. 
53 See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Pan-Arab Free Trade Area Agreement - Notification 
from Saudi Arabia, November 20, 2006, WTO Doc. No. WT/REG223/N/1.  
54 Id.  
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       Arab Countries, however, did not agree to the Saudi notification of GAFTA under 
article XXIV. Other Arab countries, led by Jordan, stated that such agreement should be 
notified under the Enabling Clause.55 Now, Arab countries are working with Saudi 
Arabia to change the notification to have GAFTA reviewed under the Enabling Clause.  
       There are different scenarios that would result if GAFTA is notified under article 
XXIV of GATT or under the Enabling Clause because of the differences between these 
two systems. GATT article XXIV condoned the establishment of free trade areas subject 
to several stringent conditions. For example, any agreement must include a plan and 
schedule for the formation of a free trade area and the formation should be achieved 
within a "reasonable length of time."56 The issue of "reasonable time" was directly 
addressed during the Uruguay Round negotiations, where it was decided that ten years 
was a reasonable length of time.57 GAFTA would lead to the establishment of free trade 
area among its members at a fixed date by 2008.   
       Article XXIV of GATT requires any contracting party deciding to enter into a free 
trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such an area, to promptly 
notify the GATT/WTO. This procedural requirement is intended to ensure the 
transparency of the proposed agreements to other WTO members and provide any 
necessary information for the examination of the agreements under article XXIV by the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. The practice in terms of the timing of 
                                               
55 E-mail from Fakhry Hazimeh, Counselor, Jordan Mission to the WTO (February 19, 2007) (on file with 
author).  
56 The word "reasonable," has caused much confusion in its interpretation. There was no agreement on just 
how much time was reasonable. For instance, the Greece-EEC Associations Agreement provided for an 
interim period of twenty-two years before final formation. See Association of Greece with the European 
Economic Community, Nov. 15, 1962, GATT B.I.S.D (11th Supp.) at 149-50 (1963). 
57 See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994. 
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notification has varied.58 With regard to GAFTA, it should have been notified to the 
WTO long time ago. GAFTA, however, was only notified to the WTO in November 
2006 despite the fact that it entered into force in 1998.        
       According to the drafters of GATT article XXIV, the objective of trade regionalism 
lies in complementing the global trading system. That is, regional free trade agreements 
are to increase trade, not raise barriers to trade with third countries. Moreover, GATT 
article XXIV requires the free trade area to eliminate trade barriers on "substantially all" 
trade among members.59 Because GAFTA was notified under article XXIV, the WTO 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements will examine and scrutinize this agreement 
more extensively to ensure that GAFTA does not adversely affect the interests of non-
members and to determine how much trade diversion it created, if any.60  
       As a general rule, article XXIV applies only to members of the WTO. For example, 
the notification requirements of article XXIV apply to the WTO members of GAFTA, but 
not to non-WTO members.61 Preferential agreements with non-members are treated under 
article XXIV.10 of GATT. Even if article XXIV is considered to be applicable with 
                                               
58 The Treaty of Rome was signed on March 25, 1957 and notified to the Contracting Parties immediately 
thereafter, with the Treaty entering into force on January 1, 1958. See WTO Secretariat, Regionalism and 
the World Trading System 12-13 (1995).   
59 Discussions in GATT Working Parties have centered on whether the concept of "substantial' should be 
understood in qualitative terms (no exclusion of major sectors) or in quantitative terms (percentage of trade 
of the members covered). See World Trade Organization, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT law and 
Practice, Vol. 2, 824-27 (1995). 
60 On February 6, 1996, the WTO General Council decided to establish the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements. Under its terms of reference, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements is mandated to 
examine regional trade agreements referred to it by the Council for Trade in Goods. See Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements - Decision of 6 February 1996, WTO Document No. WT/L/127, paragraph 1.a 
(February 7, 1996).   
61 Saudi Arabia was latest Arab country to join the WTO. See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Announces Bilateral 
Agreement Clearing Way for Saudi Arabia to Join WTO, 22 International Trade Reporter 1481 (September 
15, 2005). Members of ADFATA who are also members of the WTO are: Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and UAE. On the other hand, members of ADFATA who are 
not members of the WTO are: Algeria, Iraq, Palestinian Territories, Sudan, and Syria. See WTO, Members 
and Observers, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> (last visited 
January 3, 2007). 
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regard to GAFTA, there is also the possibility of a waiver under article XXIV.10 of 
GATT. Paragraph 10 states that proposals for free trade areas not meeting the criteria 
described in paragraphs 5 to 9 of article XXIV may be approved by a two-thirds majority 
of the contracting parties, provided that such proposals eventually lead to the formation 
of a free trade area. The drafting history indicates that paragraph 10 of article XXIV was 
intended to provide for the supervision free trade areas in which not all participants were 
GATT contracting parties.62 Moreover, it had been shown in practice that the concept 
"territories of contracting parties" included in article XXIV.5 of GATT had not been 
interpreted as restricting the ability of establishing free trade areas which include non-
GATT members.63 In most respects, a free trade agreement that complies with article 
XXIV for WTO members would likely comply for the other free trade agreement 
members as well since it may be difficult to envision free trade agreement provisions that 
are different for WTO members from the other non-WTO members.  
       Article XXIV.12 of GATT secures the observance of its trade rules by regional and 
local government authorities. The WTO members of GAFTA must ensure that GATT 
principles are observed by regional and local governments within the territories of those 
Arab members who are also WTO members. No WTO member is responsible under 
article XXIV.12 for regional and local governments that are not within that WTO 
member's territory.   
                                               
62 See WTO Secretariat, supra note 58, at 10.  
63 For example, France obtained a waiver in March 1948 for its proposed customs union with Italy, which 
was not a contracting party to the GATT at that time. In another example, the Working Party on EEC-
Agreements of Association with Tunisia and Morocco approved the established the free trade area although 
Morocco had no relation yet to the GATT at the time. See World Trade Organization, supra note 59, Vol. 2 
at 798-799, 829.     
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       Article XXIV is not the only GATT rule that permits the formation of regional trade 
agreements.64 The Enabling Clause, agreed to during the Tokyo Round, provides more 
lenient criteria for the formation of regional trade agreements among developing 
countries. For example, unlike article XXIV of GATT, the Enabling Clause drops the 
conditions on the substantial coverage of trade and allows developing countries to reduce 
tariffs on mutual trade in any way they wish. Since all members of GAFTA are 
developing countries, it would be covered by Enabling Clause, paragraph 2(c) which 
permits a regional agreement that do not meet the requirements of GATT article XXIV. If 
GAFTA was notified under the Enabling Clause, the agreement would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on Trade and Development. Moreover, GAFTA would not 
go through extensive examination. 
       The relationship between GAFTA and the WTO is further emphasized by the use of 
some references in GAFTA to the latter. For instance, GAFTA’s preamble refers to WTO 
agreements, albeit implicitly. Member states of GAFTA shall give due regard to 
international rules concerning: (1) safeguard measures;65 (2) antidumping measures;66 (3) 
measures to safeguard the balance of payments; and (4) subsidizing measures.67 
                                               
64 See Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on 
RTAs, 79 North Dakota Law Review 879, 886, 900-902 (2003). 
65 The program allowed any member state to impose, on a temporary basis, tariffs or similar taxes or 
quantitative or administrative restrictions, to protect certain domestic production from increased 
competition. Any such safeguard measure was limited in duration. Six Arab member states  
(Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) applied safeguard measures which run until 
September 16, 2002. See Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 2002, at 191, available at 
http://www.amf.org.ae/vEnglish/default.asp (last visited June 30, 2006). 
66 Dumping refers to the unfair trade practice of selling in a foreign market at below cost of production or 
home market price. Antidumping ensures a level playing field by addressing market distortions caused by 
foreign governments, specifically price discrimination and below cost sales reflecting protectionism, 
cartelization, and subsidization. See Charles M. Gastle & James Leach, The Need for an Antidumping 
Market Structure Test in the Context of Free Trade Agreements, 11 Indiana International & Comparative 
Law Review 37, 47 (2000).   
67 See Economic and Social Council of the League, Resolution No. 1317-59, supra note 21, art. I(5)-(6). 
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IV. SLOW PROGRESS IN ARAB COUNTRIES INTEGRATION 
       There are several factors that can unify Arab countries. For example, the Arabic 
language, especially in its written form which is understood all across the Arab region, 
can act as a natural unifying factor that should facilitate integration.68 However, the Arab 
region is among one of the least integrated regions in the world with respect to trade, 
capital, and investment flows. While the total exports between Arab states have increased 
from 5.3 to 7 percent during 1970 to 1998, this is less than other free trade areas.69 Even 
capital flows between Arab countries are low. This may be a result of underdeveloped 
capital markets.70 Poor trade conditions could also be traced to the political instability and 
ever-changing policies and regulations in the economic arena in Arab countries. The 
reasons for the slow progress of integration in the Arab region can be mainly attributed to 
economic and political reasons. 
A. Economic Reasons  
       Some prerequisites for an economic integration are identified in the standard 
customs union theory and the regional integration theory.71 Certain elements must be 
                                               
68 Leja, i.e. dialect or the spoken language, is not a unifying factor. The dialects differ too much. For 
example, yatikalafia is an expression of "praise" in Jordan and a "curse" in Egypt. Mabsut means "happy" 
in Jordan and "beaten up" in Iraq. Now, fusha, i.e. Modern Standard Arabic or the written language, would 
have a greater chance of unifying. Fusha is quite complex linguistically, having cases and verbal measures 
not used in leja. E-mail from Dr. Betty-Lou Leaver, Vice Chancellor for Continuing Education, the Defense 
Language Institute (February 26, 2007) (on file with author).  
69 See Gary G. Yerkey, Protectionism Curbs Development in the Middle East, 14 International Trade 
Reporter 2004 ( November 19, 1997) (Interregional trade was about 7 percent of all trade in the Middle 
East, compared with about 20 percent in the Americas, 30 percent in Asia, and 60 percent in Europe).  
70 See Daniel Pruzin, Financial Experts Urge Governments in Middle East to Reform Capital Market, 18 
International Trade Reporter 794 (May 17, 2001) (Arab countries maintain restrictions on capital flows and 
there is lack of consolidation in the banking sector. The Gulf region is overbanked with more than 200 
banks serving a population of only 30 million).  
71 The classic doctrine in matters of economic integration theory includes the following: B. Balassa, The 
Theory of Economic Integration (Allen & Unwin, 1962); C. Carraro et al. (eds), International Economic 
Policy Co-ordination (Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991); G. Lipsey, The Theory of Customs Unions: a General 
Equilibrium Analysis (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1970); J. Viner, The Customs Union Issue (Carnegie, 
1950). 
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present to ensure mutual gains from economic integration. The economies of the 
countries in question should serve to compliment one another, which offer an opportunity 
for more trade creation. The size of the market and the number of the countries involved 
may have an impact by offering more markets and hence more trade. Geographical 
proximity is also important because it reduces transportation costs. In addition, the 
openness of the market and the role of the private sector are important factors in the 
integration process. 
       With regard to how Arab countries compliment each other, the structure of imports 
and exports in different countries shows that there is a lack of complementarity in trade 
structures between most Arab countries compared to other regional blocs.72 Arab 
countries have similar exports and export markets.73 Thus, they compete with each other, 
which minimize the benefits of integration, as the comparative advantage arising from 
trading in different goods is relatively small. 
       The size of the Arab market is limited.74 The Gross Domestic Productions (GDPs) 
of Arab countries are less than the GDP of Spain.75 There is also a problem relating to the 
variations in the level of welfare between Arab countries because of large differences in 
the per-capita income. The differences in per-capita income in NAFTA and EU countries 
amount to ten fold and five fold respectively, while the difference between Arab 
                                               
72 See United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, From GATT to the WTO, at 18, 
U.N. Doc. E/ESCWA/CAB/2001/1 (2001) (Arabic version) (The structure of exports and imports of the 
Arab countries, as itemized in table 2, clearly indicates that oil products amount to more than half of total 
Arab countries’ exports. This followed by manufactured products, which amount to 15.8%. Machinery 
absorbs the lion share of imports, 34.2%, followed by manufactured products, 30.5%).   
73 Arab trade takes place in homogenous products (textiles and apparel) competing in the same markets (the 
U.S. and EC).  
74 See Arab trade: With whom? The Economist, October 10, 1998, at 49 (If Arab countries want to achieve 
economies of scale, they would do better to integrate with large markets such as North America, Japan or 
even the whole world, rather than just with each other).  
75 See Special Report: Self-doomed to Failure-Arab Development, The Economist, July 6, 2002, at 24 (the 
Arab region’s total GDP stands at $ 531 billion yearly). 
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countries is more than twenty-one fold. This large disparity discourages economic 
integration. Rich countries do not have incentive to share their wealth and poor countries 
are afraid of the growing influence of the rich countries.76 
       Although Arab countries have geographic proximity, other obstacles diminish this 
benefit. These obstacles include high tariff duties, inadequate infrastructure, and different 
means of transportation, all which increase the cost of trade.77 The high level of 
protection in Arab countries does not serve the integration plans. Despite many 
agreements to liberalize trade between Arab countries, tariffs are still higher than in non-
Arab regions. 
       Non-tariff barriers and different administrative procedures in customs authorities 
create an obstacle for economic integration. Many Arab countries still require import 
licenses for importing goods from other Arab countries. Some Arab countries also 
possess complicated banking procedures for financing and opening documentary credit 
for importing goods.78 Finally, the role of the private sector is marginal in Arab 
countries.79 This is evidenced by the fact that there is no noticeable role for the private 
sector in negotiations of Arab integration agreements. 
                                               
76 In the case of Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which comprises Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay, Uruguay and Paraguay argue that Brazil and Argentina tend to ignore their needs, impose their 
agendas, and turn a blind eye on their abysmal economic asymmetries. Recently, however, the larger 
members (Brazil and Argentina) recognized the internal asymmetries of Mercosur and of the need to help 
their smaller partners Paraguay and Uruguay improve their lot. This recognition will help cement the 
integration process so that Paraguay and Uruguay can achieve more comprehensive development and a 
better balance with the bigger economies. See Mario Esteban Carranza, South American Free Trade Area 
or Free Trade Area of the Americas? Open Regionalism and the Future Regional Economic Integration in 
South America 158 (Burlington, USA: Ashgate 2000).   
77 See Bernard Hoekman & Patrick Mersserlin, Harnessing Trade for Development and Growth in the 
Middle East 11 (Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C 2002). 
78 A survey of companies in Arab countries found that cost of trading in Arab countries is about 10.6 of 
value of trade. These costs include slow customs clearance, additional payments to customs officials, and 
large number of documents and signatures required for processing. Id. at 14, 53-56.    
79 See Ian Ayres & Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic Development 
in the Middle East, 30 Yale Journal of International Law 397, 406 (2005). 
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       The absence of a system to compensate those negatively affected by the Arab 
integration may be another reason for the slow progress in the Arab Free Trade Area 
plans. In the EU, several methods have been employed to compensate those negatively 
affected. These solutions varied between exceptions to trade liberalization, aids to 
disadvantaged territories, and longer transition periods. 
       In the final analysis, the plethora of overlapping preferential trade agreements, both 
bilateral and regional, which criss-cross the Arab world is a complicating factor. For 
example, Morocco and Tunisia are members in the Agadir Agreement of 2004, the Arab 
Maghreb Union, as well as in GAFTA.80 In addition, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan are 
members in GAFTA, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and 
share bilateral trade accords built on special preferences. These multiple overlapping 
trade agreements may have trade-distorting effects as a result of differing rules of origin 
and, for agricultural products, inconsistent seasonality regulations.81 Different rules of 
origin add to the cost of trade between Arab countries by adding further administrative 
complexity to the process. In sum, intra-Arab free trade agreements create loopholes and 
inconsistencies which are hard to study economically and would have complicating legal 
effects as well as obstructive effects on the implementation of GAFTA itself. It is uneasy 
to determine which and when these trade schemes are better for the importation of 
different goods. 
 B. Political Reasons 
       There must be political support for an economic integration. The political support 
will usually result from the integration’s political benefits, which do not threaten existing 
                                               
80 See Paul Demaret, Jean-Francois Bellis & Gonzalo Garcia Jimenez, Regionalism and Multilateralism 
after the Uruguay Round: Convergence, Divergence, and Interaction 95-106 (1997).   
81 Id. 343-348, 354.  
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political powers. It can be assumed that the elite fear that they will lose their dominating 
role because of a political integration could follow an economic integration.82 
Accordingly, there has not been a political movement to integrate among Arab countries. 
       An effective supra-national institution is needed to serve as a forum for the meeting 
of the Arab region’s leaders and to establish the integration rules and policies. Although 
the ESCL may seem at the outset as a supranational institution if it can direct the Arab 
integration program on the basis of a 2/3 vote, there are several drawbacks.83 First, the 
ESCL institution does not possess the power to establish effective independent policies. 
The members of the ESCL and their staffs are representatives of the governments of Arab 
countries and are subject to their governments' direction. Second, the ESCL decisions are 
not incorporated into the domestic legal systems of Arab countries. Arab countries could 
adopt the direct effect and supremacy of measures intended to cause economic 
integration. Third, the ESCL has a limited role in enforcing Arab countries compliance 
with the AFDATA and GAFTA norms. Although the ESCL can investigate complaints 
against any Arab country which does not conform to its obligations, ignoring the 
decisions of the ESCL does not impose higher costs in terms of trade sanctions for non-
compliance. In contrast, in the EU, the existence of the European Commission as an 
executive institution plays a critical role in the European integration. The European 
                                               
82 Though regional integration made economic sense, it would have taken political power away from the 
elites. For example, states were unwilling to cede any significant power to regional secretariats, which 
resulted in heads of states of member nations acting as supreme decision-making authorities. For this 
reason, the disintegration of virtually all integration initiatives in developing countries may largely be 
blamed on rigid adherence to the state sovereignty doctrine. See Karen E. Bravo, CARICOM, the Myth of 
Sovereignty, and Aspirational Economic Integration, 31 North Carolina Journal of International Law & 
Commercial Regulation 145, 160 (2005).  
83 There are many Arab organizations that are ineffective. These organizations lack the autonomous power 
to issue mandatory rules and policies for the region and to supervise their implementation. This problem 
affects the Arab League as well. The Charter fails to provide the Arab League with the ability to impose 
obligations on Arab countries without their consent. For description of the Arab League institutional 
structure, competence, and voting see Majid Khadduri, The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement, 40 
American Journal of International Law 756, 763 (1946). 
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Commission retains the right to initiate legal proceedings to ensure compliance with EU 
policy and legislation.84 As such, GAFTA should follow the pattern of the EU by creating 
a body with wide power to police and discipline.   
V. Recent Developments 
       The EC and U.S have put an increased emphasis on creating free trade areas with 
Arab countries. The EC concluded association agreements, as part of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, with Jordan (2002), Lebanon (2002), Syria (2002), and Egypt 
(2004).85 The U.S. Administration also proposed the establishment of a U.S.-Middle East 
free trade area by 2013.86 Thus far, the U.S. has signed bilateral trade agreements with 
Jordan (2000), Bahrain (2004), Morocco (2004) and Oman (2006).87 There can be several 
benefits accruing through such trade agreements which include: enhancing goods and 
services trade; stimulating investment flows; extending standards on intellectual property 
rights, labor, and the environment; and addressing geopolitical concerns. 
       The association and trade agreements with Arab countries are expected to have 
important implications on the GAFTA project. These agreements may create bilateral 
trade pattern (trade diversion) which discourages intra-Arab regional economic ties.88 If 
                                               
84 For more on the institutions of the European Union see Duncan E. Alford, European Union Legal 
Materials: A Guide for Infrequent Users, 97 Law Library Journal 49, 53-54 (2005). 
85 Jacqueline Klosek, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 8 International Legal Perspectives 173, 176 
(1996). 
86 See Grary G. Yerkey, President Bush Lays Out Broad Plan for Regional FTA with Middle East by 2013, 
20 Int’l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 856 (May 15, 2003) (stating that the U.S. will employ a “building-block” 
approach. This approach requires, as a first step, a Middle East country to accede to the WTO or 
concluding Trade and Investment Framework Agreement(s) (“TIFA”). Afterward, the U.S. will negotiate 
FTA with individual countries. Finally, preferably before 2013, a critical mass of bilateral FTAs would 
come together to form the broader US-Middle East FTA). 
87 See Paul G. Johnson, Shoring U.S. National Security and Encouraging Economic Reform in the Middle 
East: Advocating Free Trade with Egypt, 15 Minnesota Journal of International Law 457, 483 (2006).   
88 Economists analyze trade liberalization by considering both trade creation and trade diversion. Trade 
creation occurs when lower-cost imports from one trading partner replace domestic production from the 
other. Trade diversion occurs when lower-cost imports from a third party are prevented from entering a 
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all Arab countries do not have comparable free trade agreements with each other, i.e. if 
they do not conclude a single free trade area, then the common denominator will be the 
EC or the U.S. For example, foreign investors could choose to invest in the EC being the 
hub, because of the access it offers to all Arab countries as spokes, if the latter maintain 
high intra-regional trade barriers. In a system of hub-and-spokes, trade between each 
spoke and the hub will be more than trade among the spokes themselves. Therefore, the 
hub-and-spokes issue has the potential to dramatically reinforce and expand EC and U.S. 
influence. 
       To minimize the hub-and-spokes issue, Arab countries should actively pursue 
GAFTA by offering market access to each other and in equal footing with EC and U.S. 
investors. Such a policy is likely to diminish trade and investment diversions. 
Furthermore, the EC association agreements and U.S. bilateral trade agreements could 
support GAFTA through cumulation for purposes of rules of origin for products 
manufactured in any Arab country member of GAFTA. The cumulation rule may 
contribute to creating forward and backward linkages between Arab countries and usher 
in expansion of Arab intra-industry trade. 
       GAFTA should keep close eye on bilateral deals between Arab countries and 
outsiders. To achieve this goal, GAFTA could be modified so as not to allow its members 
to conclude free trade deals with outsiders without their partners' consent or 
consultations. Therefore, any Arab country desiring to conclude trade agreements with 
outsiders would have to seek the backing of its partners in GAFTA.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
signatory country because of tariffs or non-tariff barriers. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The 
Regulation of International Trade 130 (London: Routledge 1999). 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
       Arab countries have important affinities on political and cultural issues, as well as on 
values and on models of society, and all that should help them achieve economic 
integration. Some positive steps have been taken towards an economic integration. The 
implementation of the AFDATA and the Program is progress toward this goal. However, 
some issues are yet to be agreed upon between member states, such as rules of origin, an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism, provisions for services and labor mobility, 
protection of intellectual property, and non-tariff barriers to trade. The Program scheme is 
replete with exceptions whether for certain industrial products or for farm goods through 
the use of the Agricultural Calendar. Moreover, the lack of quality political and economic 
pre-requirements for integration is decreasing the benefits of the integration and delaying 
the realization of the Arab economic integration. 
       Beautiful speeches, hollow in content and deprived of practical consequences, have 
been familiar to Arab economic integration for decades, with small modifications in form 
and nothing new in terms of content. It remains to be seen whether Arab countries can 
build something that is useful and lasting in terms of economic integration, whether they 
are really prepared and willing to follow such a path, and whether they can lead 
themselves towards an efficient economic market. 
      I would like to conclude by sounding an optimistic note about what can be 
accomplished, despite the disconnect between the rhetoric of Arab economic integration 
and the reality of practice. Arab economic integration process is and remains valid. On 
paper, Arab economic integration is not so weak. However, the issue remains detailed 
rules and the will to implement. Therefore, minimum requirements of realistic Arab 
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economic integration must be achieved which include: (1) limited opt-out opportunities 
on the part of Arab countries; as well as limited time and enforcement periods for 
implementation; (2) an independent supranational body that drives polices and enforces 
economic integration; (3) removal of barriers to the mobile factors of production, such as 
capital and labor; (4) a legitimate dispute settlement mechanism with enforcement and 
compliance-monitoring powers; and (6) a strategic planning/decision-making mechanism 
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